Navy Hard-Pressed To Meet Sub Numbers

Despite flat defense funding and the assertion by Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding budget will not rise significantly in future years, the service continues to insist that its fleet of 256 ships must eventually increase to 313 in coming decades.

While the story lines that surround the tortured acquisition history of programs like the Littoral Combat Ship have drawn criticism from the press and Washington think tanks, there has been something going on under the sea that is just as important to the Navy’s future fighting prowess. According to its 30-year shipbuilding plan released earlier this year, the submarine fleet is slated to overtake surface combatants as the service’s largest resource drain over the next three decades, as aging Los Angeles-class attack submarines are retired and new—and expensive—hulls are put in the water. Most of this expense will come from the Virginia-class program, which now costs about $2.5 billion per hull, and will eventually number 25 hulls at a build cost of $63 billion.

The big build starts in 2011 when the Navy doubles the production rate to two submarines per year, with work being done by General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding.

The Navy operates 53 attack submarines, 44 of which are Los Angeles-class boats, with another 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and four Ohio-class guided missile submarines (SSGNs). Beginning in 2015, the service is embarking on a massive retirement plan, with remaining Los Angeles-class subs mothballed and replaced by Virginia-class attack vessels.

The Ohio-class SSBN’s will reach the end of their service life in 2027. Plans call for replacing 14 Ohio SSBNs with 12 new SSBNs starting in 2019. The Navy doesn’t plan on replacing the four SSGNs, converted from SSBNs after the Cold War, when they retire in the late 2020s.

And here is where the budgeting problems start.

When it comes to replacing SSBNs, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated earlier this year that “the lead ship of the Ohio replacement class in 2019 will cost $13 billion,” with each successive ship coming in at about the $6-7-billion range, bringing the cost of the 12-ship replacement to about $99 billion. “That may leave scant room in the Navy’s stretched shipbuilding budgets to afford other vessels [on its] wish list,” the CBO stated. That $6-7-billion price tag comes to about half of the Navy’s annual $15-billion shipbuilding budget, which means that during the 15-year period (Fiscal 2019-33) when the Navy plans on building these ships, its ability to build other vessels would be severely restricted.

Under the Navy’s 2011 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, the service says it requires 48 attack submarines and four SSGNs “to sustain our capabilities in these areas.” Still, the service’s current plan puts it on course to purchase 44 attack submarines through 2040, which would not reach its desired number. According to CBO estimates, the number of attack submarines would sink to a low of 39 in 2030 before rising to 45 in the last five years of the plan. The number is expected to drop so dramatically due to the retirement of the Los Angeles-class submarines, while the Virginia class will not be built fast enough to replace them.

Craig Hooper, a San Francisco-based national security expert who has written widely on naval and Pacific Basin security issues, is skeptical about the Navy’s submarine plans. “With no viable means for our submarine builders to compete and drive down costs,” he says, “I expect the SSBN(X) build schedule to slide right, go over-budget and ultimately shrink to maybe a 10-boat buy.” Given the current budget situation, and the fact that instead of growing, budgets might in fact contract slightly, Hooper says that the Navy should start looking for ways to allow Virginia-class subs to serve different roles. “It would be a very interesting world if Virginia-class SSNs had the flexibility to serve in either the conventional SSN, SSGN or strategic SSBN roles. That would be a massive force multiplier and a boon for the bottom line,” he says.

“[The] strategic deterrent is also changing,” Hooper adds. “As conventional weapons get increasingly accurate, America might be able to really reduce the number of submarines slated to serve in the traditional nuclear deterrent role.”