The Australian government will attempt to make defense department officials accountable for their seemingly endless run of program foul-ups, the latest centered on the NH90 helicopter.
Separately, Canberra will conduct a detailed review of the effort to field its NH90 transport version, the MRH90, putting it one step away from the “project of concern” classification that would officially label it as going off the rails.
MRH90 delays “are due to a series of key issues, including engine failure, transmission oil cooler fan failures and the poor availability of spares,” Defense Minister Stephen Smith says. The aircraft are being supplied from a Brisbane assembly line by EADS, whose Eurocopter subsidiary holds a 62.5% stake in the NH Industries consortium that produces the NH90.
Of 46 on order, 13 have been delivered, used only for testing and training. The program is running a year late for the main operator, the Australian Army, and 18 months for the Royal Australian Navy. The delay is especially troubling for Eurocopter, which is offering the naval version of the NH90 for operation from Australian warships. Its competitor is the Lockheed Martin MH-60R.
Jens Goennemann, CEO of local EADS subsidiary Australian Aerospace Ltd., says that “as with all cutting-edge aircraft, the MRH90—which is the next generation of all-composite, fly-by-wire helicopters—has faced some challenges during the qualification phase, but in partnership with the [Australian Defense Force], Australian Aerospace has addressed these quickly and effectively.”
And, Goennemann adds, “as a result of this collaboration, the two-hour cool down period and five hourly inspection requirements introduced after an engine incident on an MRH90 in 2010 are to be lifted, following the introduction of a straightforward two-minute engine cooling procedure.”
The company says further that “other concerns raised by the Commonwealth of Australia were also being successfully worked through.”
The announcement of a “high-level diagnostic review” of the MRH90 program comes as the government finds it has no choice but to sell new landing craft that, inexplicably, were built too big to fit into the assault ships that were to carry them. Eleven other procurement efforts are listed as projects of concern. Five more were remediated and two canceled.
Smith is clearly fed up with his department. “We’ve had very grave weaknesses on accountability, very grave weaknesses on internal rigor and too many examples of too many projects falling between cracks and people not taking responsibility,” he says. “That has to and will come to an end, and the reforms that I will announce over the next couple of months are aimed very squarely at that, very squarely at personal and professional accountability from [the department], both as individual officers and as an institution.”
Smith’s problem is that for as long as anyone can remember every Australian government, every few years, has tried to fix defense procurement, and yet the foul-ups have continued. Naval programs have tended to be worst, possibly because warships and their helicopters are the most complex types of equipment that Australia has built or extensively modified to its own specifications with deep local industry involvement.
The Royal Australian Air Force is much more likely to buy off-the-shelf equipment. Its two latest major purchases—Boeing C-17 Globemasters and F/A-18F Super Hornets—were ordered to the stock U.S. standard and have been meeting or beating their specification, budget and schedule.
The navy’s Kaman Super Seasprite program, which aimed for only 11 bespoke helicopters, was canceled in 2008 with almost nothing to show for the expenditure of AU$1.3 billion ($1.3 billion).
Yet the department and the navy are now managing Australia’s biggest-ever domestic arms program, the construction of three air defense destroyers in Adelaide by government shipbuilder ASC Corp. to the design of Navantia of Spain. And the government has proposed a far larger domestic effort for 12 large submarines. The current Collins Class submarines have been beset with problems in construction and operation.
More immediately, Australia is looking at buying a second-hand British Bay Class assault ship as it struggles to sustain its worn-out amphibious force.
The navy will immediately retire one of two second-hand U.S. ships after just 10 years of service, accepting a temporary reduction in force because repairs to the vessel would have been uneconomic. And if Australia can buy or lease from another navy another assault ship like the British Bay Class vessels, a second old ship may be retired early, too, says Smith.
The ship to be decommissioned, HMAS Manoora, and its sister ship, HMAS Kanimbla, were rated unseaworthy last year and have since been kept in harbor.
No comments:
Post a Comment