Editorial: Ratify New Start Treaty

The prospects of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that the U.S. and Russian presidents signed April 8 going into force this year dimmed last week when White House attempts to reassure Republicans in the Senate fell through. Under the American system, the president may sign a treaty, but it must then be ratified by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. New Start, the latest in a decades-long series of arms control agreements between the nations, would cap the number of deployed nuclear warheads on each side at 1,500 (versus 2,200 otherwise) and reduce the maximum number of delivery systems to 800. The reductions do not seem radical, and New Start has been endorsed by an impressively broad and bipartisan list of current and former U.S. military leaders and secretaries of State and Defense. But as anyone familiar with strategic matters knows, global security issues are inter-related in complex ways. Many concerns have been expressed by Republican senators, the chief ones being whether funding for modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is sufficient and whether New Start might encumber the deployment of missile defenses, including in Europe. These are certainly legitimate concerns. Other concerns strike us as less than worrisome, some as mere hand-waving. The limit on launchers would not, in our view, leave insufficient numbers of ICBMs for both nuclear and conventional warheads. The fact that New Start does not address tactical nuclear weapons is not alarming, as it does not preclude an agreement on those later and would seem to have little impact on such negotiations. We take very seriously concerns about the West not tying one hand behind its back on strategic defenses. But this treaty mentions them only in the preamble, acknowledging the “inter-relationship” of offensive and defensive weapons and noting that, currently, defenses do not affect the viability of U.S. and Russian offensive weapons. Nowhere else in the text are defenses mentioned. Thus, New Start walks up to a line but never crosses it. That leaves a difference between the White House and Arizona’s Jon Kyl, the point-man for Republican senators on New Start, on where to set the level of modernization funding. While substantial in absolute terms, the divide is relatively modest, percentage-wise. The parties should split the difference and move on to a vote on the treaty. Many opponents of voting now argue that the Senate needs more time to fully consider all the issues. But that strains credulity. The Senate Armed Services Committee held six hearings on the treaty, the Foreign Relations Committee another dozen before endorsing it in a 14-4 vote. No one seriously suggests that all agreements with Russia are a bad idea. So other critics simply complain that an administration tougher than that of Barack Obama’s would have negotiated a better deal. That begs the question: Is it still possible for Washington to get a better deal with Moscow? It is always possible to get a better deal—in theory. But one must also ask, is no deal at all better than this one? Because the original Start treaty expired Dec. 5, 2009, the U.S. and Russia currently have no restrictions whatsoever on delivery systems and no inspection regime in place. This must be remedied. There is no larger threat to U.S. national security than “loose nukes.” Permanently forgoing inspections and sacrificing controls on delivery systems would be a huge step backward, diminishing security of the largest cache of nukes outside the U.S. and undermining the case for nuclear arms controls with nations beyond Russia. So the real question becomes: Would the pursuit of a better deal offer large enough potential for improvement to offset the risks entailed in continuing without any agreement in force? Like it or not, Russia’s behavior still does have an impact on global security. The Obama administration talks of a “reset” of relations with Russia, and hardliners in Washington pooh-pooh such use of “soft power.” But Moscow not only appears more cooperative, there have been real results. For example, Russia canceled the sale of S-300 air defenses to Iran. Such defenses would certainly change Tehran’s calculations as it considers pressures and threats regarding its nuclear program. From Moscow’s perspective, New Start is a tangible benefit of its new cooperation with Washington. From President Dimitry Medvedev’s viewpoint, too, the failure of New Start at this point would strengthen hardliners who point out that the arms control regime is on the verge of collapse, and who will push for the continued development and modernization of strategic nuclear forces—already the top priority in a strained Russian budget. On balance, the risks in delaying implementation of New Start are too great and the potential for getting a better deal is too small. The Senate should not let “perfect” be the enemy of “good enough.” Ratify the New Start treaty.