U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Could Fall Short

The recent congressional authorization of the U.S. Navy’s 2011 shipbuilding acquisition plan is both good and bad news for the service.

Of course, like any service, the Navy could not be happier that lawmakers supported all of its major shipbuilding and conversion requests for the year, to the tune of $16 billion. But in approving the plan, lawmakers also kept the Navy on a collision course with its long-term fleet goals, according to analysts. The math simply does not add up, the analysts say, for what the Navy has planned now and what it expects its force structure to be in coming years, financially or operationally.

That is a point that federal analysts have tried to hammer home for some time.

“The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years,” the Congressional Research Service (CRS) states in its recent report on Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans.

Congress is now trying to get the Navy to navigate a bit more true. In authorizing the Navy plan, lawmakers noted, “The Navy’s shipbuilding plan should reflect the shipbuilding requirements that are outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).”

To better align the Navy’s plans with the QDR, the bill changes the reporting requirements of the 30-year shipbuilding schedule.

But aligning the plan better with the QDR is not the same thing as an alignment with reality. As the CRS notes in its report, the problem is with the Navy’s internal math, not its external matchup with the QDR. The Navy’s Fiscal 2011 30-year — Fiscal 2011-40 — shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships, CRS points out. “The plan does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run,” CRS states.

The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in Fiscal 2011 to 315 ships in Fiscal 2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in Fiscal 2024, drops below 313 ships in Fiscal 2027, declines to 288 ships in Fiscal 2032-33, and then increases to 301 ships in Fiscal 2039-40.

“The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan,” the report states.

And there are financial worries too. The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant Fiscal 2010 dollars, CRS says, pointing out that a May 2010 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19 billion per year in constant Fiscal 2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates.

“If the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has over the past three decades — an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars — it will not be able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan,” CBO says.

Report: Loss of 1st-Class Seats Helps BizAv

Commercial airlines continue to cancel routes and reduce available first-class and business-class seats, leaving executive travelers in the lurch and searching for alternative options, all of which is fueling a rebound in business aviation, says a new report.

The new report, published by London-based aviation service provider Air Partner, notes that beginning in 2008, major commercial airlines canceled flights to nearly 100 communities across the U.S. Mergers, such as those between Continental Airlines and United Airlines, will eliminate additional routes.

Airlines are expanding their economy classes, and some carriers are adding a premium economy seating class in lieu of traditional first class, says the report. “For example, United Airlines eliminated 20% of its international first-class seat count in 2009 and has further chopped up its first-class seats in favor of adding the Premium Economy class,” it says. “This is causing a limited availability and increased competition for premium business and first-class seats.”

Commercial aviation is finally making a profit in the wake of the recession, but airlines are hesitant to add back routes or first-class seating that had been previously removed, says the report. According to a report by the International Air Transport Association, leisure and business travel are both on the rise. “But rather than reinstall more first-class seats, they continue to be eliminated,” notes Air Partner. “First-class passengers and business travelers are finding that the convenience they once experienced flying commercially has disappeared.”

Charter operators accommodate the first-class passenger in ways that commercial airlines are no longer able—namely through convenience, flexibility and the ability to arrive at any remote destination, the report notes. There are roughly 5,000 public-use airports in this country, but commercial airlines use only about 500 of them.

“A surplus of business jets in the market has brought costs down and has lowered the barrier for many first-class passengers to afford private air charter,” says the report. “This can make it [charter] an economical choice, particularly for businesses sending a team of employees on the road.”

“This really is the perfect storm for air charter,” says Phil Mathews, president of Air Partner. “The continuing difficulties faced by executive travelers who fly commercially only adds to the value of private aviation.”

China Has Plans For Five Carriers

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is assembling the production and basing capacity to make its aircraft carrier program one of Asia’s largest military endeavors.

A plausible near-term projection for China’s aircraft carrier ambitions was revealed in two 2009 articles in Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper, which featured rare access to Chinese military and shipbuilding sources. The sources noted that China would first build two non-nuclear medium-sized carriers similar to the 50,000-ton ex-Soviet/Ukrainian Project 1143.5 carrier Varyag being rebuilt in Dalian Harbor. These carriers would start initial construction in 2009. Beginning in 2020 or soon after, two 60,000-plus-ton nuclear-powered carriers would follow, based on plans for the Soviet-designed but never built Project 1143.7 Ulyanovsk class.

This would mean a likely fleet of five carriers by the 2020s, including Varyag, which entered a phase of accelerated reconstruction in 2009. Work surrounding this carrier is also serving to create the development and production infrastructure for future carriers. Since mid-2005, Varyag’s reconstruction has been documented by images from Chinese military fans on dozens of web pages.

In April 2009, Varyag was moved from its Dalian berth to a nearby drydock. Surrounding the drydock are large ship-component construction hangars, from which the next carriers may emerge. By April 2010, the ship was berthed outside the drydock. Since the move the hull has undergone degaussing, likely in preparation for the now-visible outfitting of a new naval electronics suite. This suite will include four arrays for Chinese-developed naval phased-array radar and new rotating-array radar. Emplacements for the electronic warfare suite are visible.

A “Sinicized” model of a Varyag-like carrier, built in 2003 by students at Harbin Technology Institute, which does carrier development work, indicated it would carry a heavy fixed armament of YJ-63 long-range antiship cruise missiles, vertically launched medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and Type 730 30-mm. close-in weapon systems (CIWS). Last November, however, Internet imagery indicated it might carry a lighter weapons suite. It will be the lead platform for the short-range FL-3000N SAM, similar to Raytheon’s SeaRAM, though it carries 24 missiles. The imagery shows that Varyag will carry four FL-3000N launchers and at least two Type-730 30-mm. CIWS.

Varyag’s air wing is becoming visible. Chinese Internet sources reported that the first flight of the Shenyang Aircraft Corp.’s copy of the Sukhoi Su-33 was in August 2009, and by early 2010 Internet imagery and a video confirmed Shenyang had copied the Su-33. Since 2005 Russian sourceshave insisted to this writer that China could not copy the Su-33, as it was a radical modification of the Su-27SK design. By 2009, these sources anticipated China would purchase an upgraded Su-33 as it developed its own version with a Chinese-designed WS-10A turbofan. In 2010, an Asian source said the PLA might not be pleased with its Su-33 copy, and would consider buying the Sukhoi-built version. Since 2005, negotiations have been held up over Russia’s insistence that China buy a profitable number, around 40.

It is now expected that Shenyang will perfect its Su-33 copy, which will feature the latest Chinese-designed active phased-array radar, and new 5th-generation air-to-air missiles and long-range antiship missiles, such as an air-launched version of the YJ-63, with a range of 600-plus km. (373 mi.). Varyag may start its service with a multirole fighter more capable in some respects than the Boeing F/A-18E/F.

In 2010, Internet images appeared of a new airborne early-warning and control radar array of the size needed for a carrier aircraft. This followed a 2005 partial image of a turboprop-powered AEW&C. In October 2009, Internet images emerged of possibly retractable AEW&C radar on a Chinese Z-8 helicopter, which may form part of the initial air wing.

The PLA is also building escort ships for its carrier fleet. In the autumn of 2009 it appeared that two Chinese shipyards were building two new destroyer classes, but their configurations and equipment are not apparent. The PLA is expected to build up to 18 modern Type-065A air-defense frigates. Two new Type-093 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have been built, and a more capable Type-095 SSN is expected.

When it enters service around 2015, the Varyag and its sisters, plus escorts, may be located at a recently constructed naval base near Sanya on Hainan Island.

IG Cites Oversight Issues In BAMS Contract

The Pentagon needs to do a better job enforcing its Broad Area Maritime Surveillance contract, a recent Defense Department Inspector General (IG) report says.

“DOD officials did not have the proper controls to validate the contractor charges and performance for the BAMS contract,” the IG said in its report, released late last month.

The Navy BAMS contract with Northrop Grumman, valued at $1.8 billion, is in the third year of a seven-year contract, the IG notes, and is part of a major acquisition program worth more than $19 billion.

BAMS is an offshoot of Northrop’s Global Hawk UAV and represents a major foray by the Navy into strategic unmanned aerial systems. But the Navy and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) officials need to improve their management and administration of the BAMS contract, the IG says.

Specifically, “BAMS contracting officials did not review 39 contractor bills or validate whether the BAMS contractor was entitled to $329.3 million in payments, create or maintain a complete government-furnished property listing, or properly plan to share more than 5,000 specialized tools and testing equipment, worth more than $150 million, with the Air Force Global Hawk program,” the IG says.

These conditions occurred because BAMS contracting officials did not properly perform all of their assigned duties, comply with federal and defense policies, or complete necessary training requirements, according to the report.

As a result, the IG warns, “The BAMS program is at risk for increased costs, schedule delays, and not meeting the needs of the warfighter.”

The IG says that, based on its inquiries, Northrop reduced costs on the BAMS contract by $206,000 for travel expenses that were not covered.

DCMA officials did not develop a complete quality assurance surveillance plan, perform any contractor inspections to validate the contractor’s performance or the $329.3 million paid, revalidate outdated and previously acquired Earned Value Management (EVM) systems from 1975 and 1978, or perform the necessary surveillance of the BAMS subcontractors’ EVM systems.

“These conditions occurred because DCMA officials did not complete their assigned duties or comply with EVM guidance,” the IG reports. “As a result, contract quality requirements may not be met and Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense acquisition officials made decisions based on contractor EVM systems that may not be fully reliable.”

The IG recommends that the Defense Contract Audit Agency, DCMA and Naval Air Systems Command expedite the incurred cost audits, conduct an administrative review of BAMS contracting officials, create and maintain a complete and auditable government-furnished property listing, improve contractor surveillance and quality assurance, revalidate outdated or previously acquired EVM systems and perform surveillance of the EVM systems.

EasyJet Expands Airbus Fleet

EasyJet has exercised several options for Airbus narrowbodies and, at the same time, taken options for more of the type.

As part of the January 4 announcement, EasyJet says 15 A320 options have been converted to firm orders under substantially discounted prices granted when the airline previously placed its commitment to Airbus narrowbodies. The aircraft are to arrive between 2012-2014.

The airline also converted 20 A319 orders to A320s, reflecting a broader trend within the Airbus order book for carriers to opt for larger models. While EasyJet acknowledges it will pay more for the A320, it says the price remains below the list-price for A319s.

What is more, the airline has taken 33 more A320 options, which it can exercise by March 2013. It has made small down payments on those aircraft, with the price effectively reflecting earlier agreements.

EasyJet has slowed its fleet growth and capacity expansion plan after a bitter board fight over the issue. Airline CEO Carolyn McCall notes that “a central feature of the agreement is the flexibility it gives EasyJet to vary the growth rate in its capacity to reflect economic conditions and market opportunities.”

The airline now holds 42 outstanding orders for Airbus narrowbodies and purchase rights for 31 units. Those aircraft, although with the orders placed, represent a total commitment between the airline and Airbus for 315 units.

EasyJet’s fleet plan shows the inventory growing from 196 aircraft at the end of September 2010 to 220 units by October 1, 2013. The last Boeing 737-700s are to be phased out in the 2011-2012 fiscal year.

U.K. To Launch Defense Industrial Policy

The British government plans to unveil a new defense and security industrial and technology policy this year that will spell out the national industrial capabilities deemed essential to meetnational security needs, even in an age of austerity.

If the discussion in 2010 in U.K. defense circles was all about the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) that saw a range of high-profile defense programs cut—from the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft to the early retirement of the Harrier GR.9 fleet—then 2011 is shaping up to be the year in which the government aims to tackle long-standing policy and defense management issues that have similarly profound implications for the country’s defense industrial base.

A central element is the three-month comment period kicking off Jan. 5 (to be concluded by April 1) that is part of a green paper released on Dec. 20 entitled: “Equipment, Support, and Technology for U.K. Defense and Security: A Consultation Paper.” It is the building block on which a policy white paper will be based.

Last month, the government also named Bernard Gray as the procurement czar for the Defense Ministry. Gray was the author of a hard-hitting critique of the U.K. military procurement process highlighting many of the shortcomings in the system that led to overruns. Starting on Jan. 4, Gray now has a four-year mandate as chief of defense materiel to fix many of the problems he lamented.

In making the appointment, Defense Secretary Liam Fox says that “unlike many others who talk about the problems facing defense procurement, he talks about solutions. He will provide clear direction and leadership to [the Defense Equipment and Support organization] during the very challenging time ahead and will be a huge asset to the Defense Board and the civilian leadership team in defense.”

In July, a defense reform panel is due to make its recommendation on changes for the Defense Ministry, including in the realm of acquisition.

The planned acquisition reform efforts and defense industrial and technology policy review will be closely watched by industry. Several senior industry officials have indicated they are concerned the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government that took power in May has been more indifferent to industry’s concerns than the previous Labour government. While there was a recognition that during the conduct of the SDSR such distance was required, recent months have seen growing concern the government is not as willing to listen to the views voiced by the aerospace and defense sector.

In reaction to the formal launch of the green paper on Dec. 20, Ian Godden, president of the Aerospace, Defense and Security lobbying group says that “this will help industry—from large multinationals to small and medium-sized businesses—engage fully with the [Defense Ministry], the Home Office and government more widely in order to identify what the government requires of industry to support our armed forces and as a major contributor to wealth creation in this country.”

One area some industry officials have expressed concern over is support for exports, which the government vowed to strengthen. The green paper reiterates the government’s commitment to across-ministerial support for such sales.

Another area to be addressed in the pending policy is how the government plans to deal with equipment competitions or strategic purchasing to sustain national capabilities. In its green paper, the government echos the tenets of the previous Defense Industrial Strategy. The DIS, spelled out in December 2005, aimed to balance the need for maintaining key skills with buying off-the-shelf, and created several funding initiatives, such as Team Complex Weapons, to preserve capacities deemed essential.

The green paper states that “our default position is to use open competition in the global market, to buy off-the-shelf where we can, and to promote open markets in defense and security capabilities. We will take action to protect our operational advantages and freedom of action, but only where essential for national security.” The policy is designed to inform spending decisions for the next few years, at least until the next SDSR which is planned for 2015.

“A key priority, therefore, is identifying the handful of critical areas where the U.K. has or needs an operational advantage and freedom of action for a particular capability, where we may have to take action to sustain the underpinning technologies and skills in order to protect our national security. To achieve this, especially at a time of financial challenge, may involve encouraging innovative approaches to and opening up wider markets for important capabilities.”

The effort to devise a new industrial strategy is more complex this time around than five years ago, not just because of greater fiscal austerity, but also because the U.K. already has committed to increasing cooperation with French defense industry on a range of projects, some of which remain to be defined. That is already reflected in the green paper, which states that “acceptance of greater mutual dependence on some of our key allies” may be required.

The green paper, for the first time, combines defense and security in its review, and also addresses cybersecurity, which the government has singled out in the SDSR as a major area of focus and one of the few spending areas projected to see growth. The government has yet to spell out how it will spend the additional £650 million ($1 billion) earmarked for cybersecurity in the next few years. It is also a domain in which government plans to work particularly closely with the private sector, with details due to emerge this year when the “Cyber Security Strategy” is unveiled.

The green paper provides little guidance on what defense industrial skills the government plans to protect, although it notes that defensive measures against chemical and biological weapons are one area in which the country wants to have independence.

In addition, the green paper highlights several science and technology areas in which it believes a more effective, cross-government strategy is required, including activities in the realms of space, autonomous systems, nanotechnology, neuroscience, sensor systems, cyberspace and energy.

One segment of industry that will be monitoring the outcome of the industrial policy review particularly closely is small and medium-sized enterprises. While Britain’s top-tier aerospace and defense companies have long become less dependent on their small domestic market—BAE Systems derives the bulk of its revenue from the U.S.—for lower-tier companies the revenue picture is often different.

The government signals it is eager to sustain a healthy cadre of subcontractors and is eying policies aimed at sustaining smaller firms. “We will consider whether [Defense Ministry] guidance should encourage procurement teams in certain cases specifically to welcome bids from consortia [of SMEs],” the green paper states. The government may also make the use of British SMEs a requirement when awarding sole-source contracts and, when programs are competed, bidding prime contractors may be required to furnish lists of likely subcontractors, including small businesses.

Another area to be scrutinized is support services. The U.K. has been increasingly looking to contractor logistics support in key areas. The green paper notes that the government is “currently looking into ways of developing our support activities with industry. This could include new employment models, looking at regular military, reserves, civil servants and contractors working alongside each other to deliver seamless assured support to our military commanders. We would need to be aligned in processes, procedures and information flows so that we can reduce costs, risks and administrative friction.”

Indian Launch Mishap Linked To Connector Failure

The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) says the Dec. 25 failure of a Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV-F06) carrying the GSAT-5P satellite was caused by the untimely and inadvertent snapping of a group of 10 connectors located at the bottom portion of the rocket’s Russian-made cryogenic upper stage.

Some of these connectors carry command signals from the onboard computer—located in the equipment bay near the top of the vehicle—to the control electronics of the four L40 strap-ons of the first stage. The connectors are intended to separate at 292 sec. after lift off. The premature termination of the connectors interrupted commands to the first-stage control electronics, leading to loss of control and break-up of the vehicle, according to ISRO. The exact cause of the connector malfunction remains to be determined.

The 2,130-kg. (4,700-lb.) GSAT-5P was to replace the INSAT-2E satellite, launched in 1999. Carrying 24 C-band transponders and 12 extended C-band transponders, it was the heaviest satellite lofted by an Indian launch vehicle.

The performance of the GSLV-F06 flight was normal up to 47.5 sec. from lift off, when the rocket began to lose its orientation, leading to higher structural loads and finally the breakup of the vehicle at 53.8 sec. from launch. A destruct command was issued from the ground at 64 sec.

Energia, Roscosmos Officials Sacked Over Glonass Crash

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has sacked two top executives involved in a Dec. 5 Proton Block DM launch failure that destroyed three Glonass M spacecraft.

The firings, which were accompanied by an official reprimand to Anatoly Perminov, head of national space agency Roscosmos, reflect Medvedev’s fury over the incident, which prevented him from meeting a promised deadline of having a full 24-satellite Glonass constellation in place by the end of 2010.

The executives dismissed were Vyacheslav Filin, chief rocket and space system designer at Energia, and Viktor Remishnevsky, deputy head of Roscosmos. An interim inquiry report issued on Dec. 23 attributed the failure to a miscalculation that led to an oversupply of liquid oxygen to the Block DM upper stage, which is made by Energia. The report said company management also did not follow all pre-launch safety procedures, and subsequently failed to spot the miscalculation.

Some observers think the sackings could presage a further shakeup within Energia, which is already involved in restructuring and streamlining efforts aimed at bringing Sea Launch back into service, after its long stint in Chapter 11. Energia provides the Block DM-SL upper stage for Ukrainian Zenit 3SL launch vehicles used by Sea Launch, and last year became the main shareholder in the launch company

A deep restructuring of the Proton supply chain after a pair of failures in 2007-08 is credited with turning around both prime contractor Khrunichev and International Launch Services, which subsequently took over the launch provider. The Proton M’s spotless record since 2008, combined with its speedy return to service on Dec. 27, once the inquiry report ruled out the rocket’s involvement in the incident, would seem to underscore the utility of these changes.

Budget Threat to Business Travel, CAA says

In a new study on the evolution of business-class air travel, the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) argues that new markets being opened by modern telecommunications tools are offsetting any negative impact the sector is have on the segment of transport.

But the organization is less sanguine about the effects of budget austerity measures being implemented. “The U.K. Government’s public spending cuts, and associated reductions in public employment and administrative costs, are likely to have a direct dampening effect on business air travel demand,” the CAA says.

The latter issue is compounded by a revised growth forecast for the U.K. for 2011, in part owing to higher tax levels coming into effect.

The latest report largely focuses on the developments for business travel during the recent two years. The CAA document largely validates what airline officials have been saying for some time, that some of the loss in business travel will be permanent. British Airways CEO Willie Walsh has long warned short haul business travel will never recover to pre-recession levels. The CAA report echoes that view, noting that “the recession hastened the migration of short haul business travelers from Business Class to travelling in Economy and using no frills carriers, and there is a general acceptance that economic recovery will not reverse this trend.”

Overall, the CAA records a 22% decline in 2008 and 2009 in business-class air travel, with the first two quarters seeing further drops.

On North American routes, the CAA reports a drop off to 16% from 27% in the number of travelers using business or first-class services comparing 2009 and 2007 figures. In the same years premium economy usage increased to 17% from 14%. On other long-haul routes the first/business-class decline went from 24% to 13%.

China's J-20 Stealth Fighter In Taxi Tests

China’s first known stealth aircraft just emerged from a secret development program and was undergoing high-speed taxi tests late last week at Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute’s airfield. Said to be designated J-20, it is larger than most observers expected—pointing to long range and heavy weapon loads.

Its timing, Chengdu’s development record and official statements cast doubt on U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s 2009 prediction (in support of his decision to stop production of the Lockheed Martin F-22) that China would not have an operational stealth aircraft before 2020.

The debut of the J-20 was announced in a November 2009 interview on Chinese TV by Gen. He Weirong, deputy commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. The general said a “fourth-generation” fighter (Chinese terminology for a stealth fighter) would be flown in 2010-11 and be operational in 2017-19.

The J-20 is a single-seat, twin-engine aircraft, bigger and heavier than the Sukhoi T-50 and the F-22. Comparison with ground-service vehicles points to an overall length of 75 ft. and a wingspan of 45 ft. or more, which would suggest a takeoff weight in the 75,000-80,000-lb. class with no external load. That in turn implies a generous internal fuel capacity. The overall length is close to that of the 1960s General Dynamics F-111, which carries 34,000 lb. of fuel.

The J-20 has a canard delta layout (like Chengdu’s J-10) with two canted, all-moving vertical stabilizers (like the T-50) and smaller canted ventral fins. The stealth body shaping is similar to that of the F-22. The flat body sides are aligned with the canted tails, the wing-body junction is clean, and there is a sharp chine line around the forward fuselage. The cant angles are greater than they are on the Lockheed Martin F-35, and the frameless canopy is similar to that of the F-22.

The engines are most likely members of the Russian Saturn AL-31F family, also used on the J-10. The production version will require yet-to-mature indigenous engines. The inlets use diverterless supersonic inlet (DSI) technology, first adopted for the F-35 but also used by Chengdu on the J-10B—the newest version of the J-10—and the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder.

The main landing gears retract into body-side bays, indicating the likely presence of F-22-style side weapon bays ahead of them. The ground clearance is higher than on the F-22, which would facilitate loading larger weapons including air-to-surface munitions. Chinese engineers at the Zhuhai air show in November disclosed that newly developed air-to-ground weapons are now required to be compatible with the J-20.

Features at the rear of the aircraft—including underwing actuator fairings, axisymmetrical engine exhausts and the ventral fins—appear less compatible with stealth, so the J-20 may not match the all-aspect stealth of the F-22. There are two possible explanations for this: Either the aircraft seen here is the first step toward an operational design, or China’s requirements do not place as much stress on rear-aspect signatures.

The major open question at this point is whether the J-20 is a true prototype, like the T-50, or a technology demonstrator, with a status similar to the YF-22 flown in 1990. That question will be answered by whether, and how many, further J-20s enter flight testing in the next 12-24 months.

Developing an effective multi-mission stealthy aircraft presents challenges beyond the airframe, because it requires a sensor suite that uses automated data fusion, emission control and low-probability-of-intercept data links to build an operational picture for the pilot without giving away the aircraft’s own location.

A rapid development program would be a challenge for China’s combat aircraft industry, which is currently busy: The J-10B, FC-17 and Shenyang’s J-11B and carrier-based J-15 are all under development. However, the progress of China’s military aviation technology has been rapid since the first flight of the J-10 in 1996, owing to the nation’s growing economy and the push by the People’s Liberation Army for a modernized military force in all domains. Before the J-10, China’s only indigenous production combat aircraft were the Shenyang J-8 and Xian JH-7, reflecting early-1960s technology from Russia and Europe.

Engine development has lagged airframe development, with reports that the Shenyang WS-10 engine, slated to replace Russian engines in the J-11B, has been slow to reach acceptable reliability and durability levels. That may not be surprising, given that high-performance engine technology is founded on specialized alloys and processes that often have no other uses. (The existence of the J-11B, essentially a “bootleg” version of the Su-27, has been a strain on relationships between the Russian and Chinese industries.)

Progress with avionics may be indicated by the advent of the J-10B, with new features that include a canted radar bulkhead (normally associated with an active, electronically scanned array antenna), an infrared search-and-track system, and housings for new electronic warfare antennas.

One question that may go unanswered for a long time concerns the degree to which cyberespionage has aided the development of the J-20. U.S. defense industry cybersecurity experts have cited 2006—close to the date when the J-20 program would have started—as the point at which they became aware of what was later named the advanced persistent threat (APT), a campaign of cyberintrusion aimed primarily at military and defense industries and characterized by sophisticated infiltration and exfiltration techniques.

Dale Meyerrose, information security vice president for the Harris Corp. and former chief information officer for the director of national intelligence, told an Aviation Week cybersecurity conference in April 2010 that the APT had been little discussed outside the classified realm, up to that point, because “the vast majority of APT attacks are believed to come from a single country.”

Between 2009 and early 2010, Lockheed Martin found that “six to eight companies” among its subcontractors “had been totally compromised—e-mails, their networks, everything,” according to Chief Information Security Officer Anne Mullins.

The way in which the J-20 was unveiled also reflects China’s use and control of information technology to support national interests. The test airfield is located in the city of Chengdu and is not secure, with many public viewing points. Photography is technically forbidden, but reports suggest that patrols have been permitting the use of cell phone cameras. From Dec. 25‑29, these images were placed on Chinese Internet discussion boards, and after an early intervention by censors—which served to draw attention to the activity—they appeared with steadily increasing quality. Substantial international attention was thereby achieved without any official disclosures.